Sociological Implications of Scientific Publishing: Open Access, Science, Society, Democracy and the Digital Divide Ulrich Herb, Saarland University and State Library Repository Manager, Specialist Electronic Publishing & Open Access u.herb@sulb.uni-saarland.de Abstract Claims for Open Access are mostly underpinned with a) science-related arguments (Open Access accelerates scientific communication) b) financial arguments (Open Access relieves the serials crisis), c) social arguments (Open Access reduces the Digital Divide), d) democracy-related arguments (Open Access facilitates participation) e) and socio-political arguments (Open Access levels disparities). Using sociological concepts and notions, this article analyses some of the assumptions mentioned above. It focuses strongly on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of (scientific) capital and its implications for the acceptance of Open Access, on Michel Foucault's discourse analysis and on the implications of Open Access for the concept of the Digital Divide. Bourdieu's theory of capital implies that the acceptance of Open Access depends on the logic of power and the accumulation of scientific capital. It does not depend on slogans derived from hagiographic self-perceptions of science (e.g. the acceleration of scientific communication) and scientists (e.g. their will to share their information freely). According to Bourdieu's theory, it is crucial for Open Access (and associated concepts like alternative impact metrics) how scientists perceive its potential influence on existing processes of capital accumulation and how Open Access will affect their demand for distinction. Concerning the Digital Divide concept, Foucault's discourse analysis suggests that Open Access may intensify disparities, scientocentrisms and ethnocentrisms. Additionally, several concepts from the philosophy of sciences (Karl Raimund Popper, Samuel Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend) and their implicit connection to the concept of Open Access are described in this paper. Justifications of Open Access Science-related justifications The discrepancy between the technical opportunity of instant and global access to electronic scientific information and the de facto restricted access to this information leads to the science-related claim for Open Access. The only barrier to scientific information that is accepted by Open Access protagonists is the need to use the Internet as a technical infrastructure. By definition, Open Access documents reside electronically in the Internet and may by used by anyone without paying any fee. In this way, immediate access to scientific information, free of charge, is made possible. Following these arguments, it can be said that Open Access ensures an accelerated scientific communication and fosters new scientific findings. Financial justifications Paying any fee for the use of scientific documents will annoy scientists as long as they do not get any reward for their contribution, e.g. as authors or as peers reviewing papers of colleagues. Accordingly, the Budapest Open Access Initiative stated in 2002: „The literature that should be freely accessible online is that which scholars give to the world without expectation of payment“ (BOAI, 2002). The licensing fees for scientific journals are considered the access barrier to scientific information, as universities and their libraries can hardly afford these fees in times of mostly declining budgets and rising costs. (House of Commons, 2004; EPS, 2006). Thus, the case in favour of Open Access is bolstered by financial arguments. A Social Justification: the Digital Divide Closely bound up with the financial arguments are assumptions promising that Open Access will help to close the digital divide. The concept of digital divide says that * opportunities to access relevant information are allocated unequally; furthermore, the degree to which people get these opportunities depends on social factors; and * this unequal distribution has social impact: Whoever has access to relevant information gains or accumulates better prospects – e.g. regarding social, economic or health issues. If information is available freely or for free (with the additional condition that Internet access is a given), people usually separated from toll access information take advantage of Open Access – which highlights at this point the connection to theories of democracy. Democracy Concepts of participative democracy assume that intense participation in political and societal processes by as many citizens as possible and the broad expertise of the citizens are the basis of a truly functioning democracy. This requires an open discourse about as many relevant topics as possible, in order to serve the democratic principles and to reach rational and reasonable decisions and governance based on broad participation. Common civil rights such as the freedom of assembly and the freedom of the press are derived from this concept. More detailed thoughts about democracy and participation were formulated by Jürgen Habermas (1984) in his publication „The Theory of Communicative Action“. Both the science-related justification of Open Access and the participative model of democracy share the same meta-assumption: the free access to information and the free exchange of information facilitate an optimised discussion – regardless of whether it is focused on scientific or political questions. Sociopolitical justifications Open Access also is considered as reducing social inequities, disparities and disadvantages. Assuming that western societies are – as widely alleged – information societies, information is the most vital resource or good for people living in these societies. The opportunities and chances to participate, share and use the resources and goods should then shape those societies, which means that information should create relations between actors which can take the form of exchange, trade, power, dominion or disparities. Even if the notion of information societies is superficial (after all, the regulation and distribution of information has always given structure to groups or societies), at first glance Open Access may claim to reduce disparities since everyone (with Internet access) may benefit from the information provided. Recapitulation At first glance, the moral vibrancy of Open Access is overwhelming, the notion itself seems imbued with charismatic aura. Seen through the prism of the arguments above, Open Access has a moral relevance and scope which goes far beyond the issues of scientific communication. This connotation exists a priori and is hedged by an asserted universality of the following arguments: Open Access appears as a moral necessity that can hardly be questioned or examined (Haider, 2007). Furthermore, the properties of Open Access are linked to concepts of openness, interrelatedness and globalization (Fröhlich, 1996). In examining the implicit and explicit assumptions of the aforementioned arguments the following questions are posed: Is a free and disinterested exchange of information really the prevailing interest of scientists? Or should statements to that effect rather be seen as some kind of lip service? Might it not be a more accurate assumption that scientists in reality are acting selfishly, striving for an accumulation of scientific capital that has to be gained and defended in distribution struggles (Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, 2002)? Does accessibility of information via electronic networks really level social disparities? Or do claims of this nature just prefigure that a technical utopia is turning into a social utopia? (Fröhlich, 1995) Can the free interchange of information with groups or countries be considered as truly altruistic? Or does it transmit ethnocentrisms? (Haider, 2006) Scientific Publishing: A sociological analysis Journals, Impact Factor, Careers Scientists are not very well-informed about the potential of Open Access (Hess et al., 2007), nor do they use Open Access publication services in relevant numbers and ways (DFG, 2005; Swan and Brown, 2005). Robert Kiley and Robert Terry from the Wellcome Trust explain this reticence on the part of the scientists through the scientists’ position within the circle of production, distribution and consumption of scientific information. [insert here figure1.gif] Figure 10.1 from Robert Kiley and Robert, 2006. “Open access to the research literature: a funders perspective,” In: N. Jacobs (editor). Open Access: Key Strategic, Technical and Economic Aspects, p. 102. The public authorities are the major funding sources for research and researchers. Researchers in turn publish their results as articles in journals – mostly the journals of toll access publishing houses – and usually without getting any reward. Libraries pay licensing fees to offer the scientists of their universities access to relevant information, which means: access to the results of their colleagues’ work. Libraries themselves are financed by the public authorities, too. From the perspective of a funder or financier, this process must surely appear as inefficient out-sourcing; tax money is spent for paying the producers of scientific information as well as its buyers. Scientists as consumers of this information are mostly not interested in changing this scheme. Firstly, they have to pay neither for the consumption nor for the access to the information. Secondly, their relations to the other actors have a neutral or positive valence: In most scientific disciplines, there is no circulation of money between authors and publishing houses; for the use of journals subscribed to by the central library of their university authors do not have to pay any money, and the fourth actor, the public authority, even pays their salaries. Therefore, the scientists see no reason to change a situation which offers them so many luxuries. Even more importantly, the diagram of Kiley & Terry misses the most salient relation: Between publishing houses and scientists there exists a connection of greatest importance for scientists, a connection which has an eminent positive valence and which at the same time constitutes a dependency: Scientists desiring to advance their career have to publish in journals that enjoy a high Journal Impact Factor (JIF). Otherwise their career will shipwreck and their aspirations will turn into frustration as the publication of their results only in these journals will award them scientific capital. Economic, cultural and social capital The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu differentiates between three types of capital: economic, cultural, and social capital (Bourdieu, 1997, pp. 47-79). Cultural capital exists mainly in the form of education or cultivation and as knowledge which is aggregated by attending institutions of learning. Cultural capital has three specifications: incorporated (internalized), objectified (represented through objects, books, paintings) and institutionalized (formally codified by academic titles). Social capital– generally speaking – encompasses resources which are based on the affiliation to a group or a network of more or less institutionalized relationships. A person’s specific position is determined by the accumulated economic, cultural and social capital and their arrangement. As a rule, economic capital dominates the other types of capital – but depending on the social field other field-specific types of capital may occur which may even break the dominance of economic capital within this field. Bourdieu describes a field as “a universe encompassing all actors and institutions that create and disseminate art, literature or science. This universe is like any other social universe, but follows more or less specific social rules. This relatively autonomous microcosm, equipped with its own rules and laws, is subsumed in the field concept. Like the macrocosm, the field is subject to social rules, but they are different rules. Although the field as microcosm is never entirely independent of the constraints of the macrocosm, it does enjoy a measure or autonomy which can be greater or smaller.”1 (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 18, translated by U.H.) At the same time, these fields are fields of force, power and struggle: „Every field, also the scientific field, is a force-field and a realm of constant struggle about the preservation or the change of the forces ruling the field. It is possible to describe a scientific realm like a physical universe with inherent relations of power and of supremacy.“2 (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 20, translated by U.H). Bourdieu devotes himself explicitly to the field of science in „Homo academicus“(Bourdieu, 2002) and in „ Les usages sociaux de la science “(Bourdieu, 1998). In this specific field, scientific capital complements and dominates the other three types of capital. Scientific capital and scientific communication Bourdieu (1998) differentiates two types of scientific capital and the types of power connected to them : a) Secular, political, institutional, and institutionalised power, which can be found mostly within the bureaucracy of science and which is accumulated through the use of political strategies. Its transfer and heredity – as with all sorts of bureaucratic capital – is easily achieved. b) Specific or individual power, personal prestige, pure scientific capital, based on recognition and to a large extent independent of the secular power, but much more affected by challenges than (a). Its accumulation is based on publications. This type of scientific capital is volatile, which also means it is difficult to transfer. To Bourdieu, this is the purest type of scientific capital; it will be considered in the following. Bourdieu identifies the citation index as an indicator of the scientific capital (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 23): This capital is mainly developed and accumulated through publication in journals with a high JIF. The reputation derived from a scientist’s publication behaviour and the JIF distilled from that behaviour is ? of symbolic nature: It is based solely on the appreciation by relevant people and institutions within the field of science. If this appreciation crumbles, the entire value of the investment is lost. Only due to this appreciation does the investment constitute a valid exchange value whose only purpose is the transformation into access to relevant resources. Scientific capital is „based on the recognition (or the credit) which is granted by all the peers and competitors in the scientific field.”3 (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 23, translated by U.H.) ? socially constructed: It is nothing god-given, but a regulatory mechanism in the context of granting or obstructing chances. In general, these chances reflect the probability or chance to enjoy specific privileges: maybe in the form of lucrative appointments, project fundings or activities as referees or experts. These privileges in turn foster tendencies towards a further and faster accumulation of scientific capital and power, which itself brings along material profits such as higher incomes or complaisances from worthwhile relationships, or networks and symbolic profits like professional reputation, access to internal (and therefore valuable) information, or membership in exclusive groups or associations. Hence the JIF is not only a profoundly criticisable artefact which claims to measure the quality of scientific information, it is above all a regulatory mechanism in the allocation of privileges. Within in the field of science, adherence to orthodox practices and allocation mechanisms can be explained in the same way as in other fields: Scientific capital and scientific careers are “the result of an investment which must pay off. And the holders of the subscription vouchers will defend their ‘capital’ and their ‘profits’ by defending the institutions that are the guarantors of this capital.”4 (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 23, translated by U.H.). This is clearly evident: Publications in Open Access Journals are mostly ignored in efficiency ratings, evaluations or appointments (Björk, 2004). The disparate allocation of capital is vital and essential for every field and is therefore sacrosanct. Actors which have benefited from distributive mechanisms of capital have little or no interest in changing these mechanisms or evening out these disparities – because the disparate allocation of power is shaping and structuring the fields. This means: Whoever owns scientific capital in sufficient amounts has the “chance to set not only the rules of the game but also regularities, for examples the laws governing the allocation of profits and prizes or the decisions regarding which research subjects are important and worthwhile and what is to be considered as extraordinary or as outdated.”5 (Bourdieu, 1998. p. 23 f., translated by U.H.). For Bourdieu, the field of science is „a place and an object of battle, in perception as well as in reality.”6 (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25, translated by U.H.). Consequently, he calls the assumption that there are no distributive mechanisms or distributive struggles in this field an illusio (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 27). Its illusionary essence is revealed in the claim that scientific interest – compared to conventional interests (especially those found in the economic field) – is unselfish: „at a subliminal level, the ‘pure’ and unselfish interest is an interest in selflessness, a kind of interest that is characteristic of the economy of all symbolic goods; in this economy, it is the unselfishness which carries the reward. Thus, in a certain way, the strategies of the actors are always two-faced, ambiguous, driven by interests as well as disinterested, inspired by a kind of unselfish self-interest which allows for completely antagonistic but equally erroneous (on account of their one-sidedness) description of motives – one hagiographic and idealizing, the other cynical and reductionist in its denunciation of a scientific capitalist as a capitalist like any other.”7 (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 27, translated by U.H.). This is consistent with the findings of Gerhard Fröhlich (1998). According to Fröhlich, there is a strategic retention of information within or between teams and laboratories, in scientific publications and at scientific congresses existing side-by-side or even replacing the officially proclaimed free and open competition of ideas. One could even assume this retention of information is not the exception but rather the rule, or at least the prevalent practice. In Fröhlich’s view, the unselfishness of scientists is very limited; he describes the principles of scientific communication as follows (Fröhlich, 1998, p. 541): * Communicate informally just as much as absolutely necessary to keep corporations alive. * Publish only as much as indispensable to preserve one’s claim for priority on the findings and their originality. * Circulate informally or publish as little information of practical use as possible to prevent competitors from taking competitive advantage from this information. Fröhlich describes valuable information as objects of secrecy, objects of barter, gifts – generally as objects of value that will not be randomly scattered amidst the scientific public – let alone in the anonymous or potentially property-antagonistic anarchism of the Internet. The retention of information pertains, for example, to details about experimental series (the so-called local knowledge), undocumented information of practical use, information concerning the context of scientific discovery, and of course the verbal specification through a very codified jargon (Fröhlich, 1998, pp. 540 f.). Thus, it seems treacherous to assume the prevailing concern of scientists to be an open communication and the open exchange of information: “We are far from the ideal of a free market, which is currently being commended so highly; the effects of such a market can only be wished upon science.”8 (Pierre Bourdieu interviewed by Frank Nouchi 1993 in: Bourdieu, 1998, p. 80, translated by U.H.). Open information networks = Excluding information networks? Fröhlich (1998, p. 546) assents to Bourdieu’s point of view and criticizes at the same time the presumption that Internet-based communication, per se, would have a levelling and democracy-boosting effect as a harmonistic-utopian promise. With regard to Bourdieu’s theories of fields and distinction, Fröhlich describes computer networks as social fields like any others, especially in their capacity as vertically stratified and structured fields of competition. Like in all other fields, people keep pursuing their strategies, have their agendas and are trying to reach their aims also when they are utilizing computer networks: They want to gain and raise their reputation, build exclusive groups and exclude others. No matter how open the technical conception of a network or infra-structure might be – they are cogitated, devised, shaped and used by human beings. Consequently, their factual utilization is subject to the same human interests and necessities like the networks constructed for the sake of distinctiveness and power. To Fröhlich (1998), power is a structural feature of all social relations. To him, power means control over operational resources which are required by others. Thus, the retention, blockade, and deferral of information is an effective strategy in the different social fields of competition. Information which is operationally relevant and available at precisely the right point in time, both structurally and practically detailed information, is a ubiquitously valuable good which is intentionally made rare. The strategic, operational, and distinctive value of operational information drops the more the information becomes commonly available. Therefore, Fröhlich states that professions and other powerful groups or corporations live on the retention and monopolization of information. Both the belief, the mere availability of information would lead to democracy, and the belief that a decentralisation of technical infrastructures (especially the Internet) would lead to a levelling of asymmetric allocations of power are myths (Fröhlich, 1995; Fröhlich, 1996). It would be more realistic to expect a centralisation and accumulation of power supported and sustained by the Internet. Before the WWW-era started, there surely was no equivalent to global warehouses such as amazon.com. According to Fröhlich, a further concentration of power and capital in the cosmopolitan cities can be assumed, made possible by the structure of the Internet (Fröhlich, 1996, p. 296). Following this view, statements about the liberalizing or democratising effects of Open Access have to be put into perspective: Despite an accelerated exchange and the free accessibility of information, its availability and usability still is subject to a multitude of restrictions and sublimations. Digital Divide & Information Poverty, Ethnocentrisms and the Theory of Science Reflections on Open Access mostly ignore not only the field-immanent factors mentioned widely but also the external implications of this concept. This is especially true for the significance of Open Access within the digital divide discussion. In this discussion, developing countries are usually conceptualised as homogenous entities and as objects – not actors – which can partake of the true promise of scientific information produced in western Europe or the USA free of charge by consuming Open Access publications. The advantages the so-called developing countries seem to get through using this information may be readily apparent to most people when they think of public health information or primary data. In these cases, the use or reuse of this information may be of immediate practical use or may save those countries immense expenses for the design or realization of research studies of their own. Nevertheless, the problem remains whether the answers derived from data researched with these studies are appropriate to the questions of the so-called developing countries and (with Bourdieu and Fröhlich in mind) whether the utilization is even possible without the lengthy, time-consuming and laborious incorporation of scientific and cultural capital. Jutta Haider (2006) analyzed the connections between the discussion about Open Access and about information poverty. At the point where these two discussions intersect, Open Access is commonly described as an instrument which reduces information poverty. Countries suffering from information poverty are mostly identified by economic (poor countries) or technical (countries with a weak infrastructure) parameters. This notion hides a glaring traditional ethnocentrism: The transformation of all societies based on the model of occidental societies is considered an evolutionary universalism. Furthermore, valuable information is equated with western science, which is considered to produce true and correct knowledge without any further scrutiny. Haider (2006) analyses the notion of information poverty by means of Foucaultian discourse analysis. Foucault (1972) describes a discourse as a special concept of reality which represents and perpetuates itself in the language it is framed in. A discourse formulates specific rules which determine a view of reality via our language. These rules also define within a specific context, a field of knowledge, a scientific field or even an abstract notion or idea (e.g. globalization) what is allowed to be said, what should be said and also what must not be said, and who is allowed to say what at which point in time. The discourse is tightly linked to power; it pretends to describe reality, but in fact, it prescribes reality. Using the concept of discourse, Haider examines the use of the notion information poverty in the developmental discourse and in the Library and Information Science (LIS) Discourse. Information poverty is – even regarding its components – tied to the LIS (information) and developmental (poverty) discourse (Haider and Bawden, 2006). Both discourses also converge in the discussion about the digital divide. Within the LIS-discourse, countries suffering from information poverty appear to be objects, consignees of true und correct information: Whoever is labelled as information-poor remains passive und is object to interventions by experts. In the special case of information poverty, it is information professionals, information scientists and librarians that are purporting to be these benefactors. This construction perpetuates the subordination of developing countries under the postulated expertise of the privileged western countries, which are equipped with power. This hierarchical stratification reproduces power and control over the developing countries. If Open Access is conceptualised as a tool or resource to reduce the digital divide, it is sanctioning existing dependencies and reinforces asymmetric allocations of discursive, political and materialistic power. This implicitly raises the question whether Open Access, within the Digital Divide discussion, supports a western knowledge imperialism and it also hints at interesting implications from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The basic question regarding Open Access is whether there is a) a widely correct, well-proven (but still approximative) knowledge which is accumulating through evolution and which is represented in science. This position is held, for instance, by Karl Raimund Popper (1992). Or whether there are b) several entirely different paradigms of knowledge which are not evolutionary in character, but which are chronologically following one another. This is the position of Samuel Kuhn (1970). Or whether there are c) several entirely different paradigms of knowledge which are not evolutionary and which exist simultaneously. This view was formulated by Paul Feyerabend (1975). The function of Open Access within the notion of Digital Divide is closely bound up with position a); thus, Open Access contributes to a global standardization and to a homogenization of cultural patterns of interpretation. Liberalising elements Nevertheless, Open Access gives scientists from developing countries an opportunity to make their own scientific information available free of charge and to distribute it globally within a matter of minutes. In this way, Open Access offers also the possibility to become an active partner in scientific discussions. Jutta Haider (2005) examined how the production of Open Access journals is distributed over the world. She found out that significantly more Open Access journals are published in developing countries than in non-developing countries. Although constraints such as (sometimes very high) article publication fees and occasionally insufficient or absent technical infrastructures are obstructing Open Access publishing in these countries (Papin-Ramcharan and Dawe, 2006), Open Access nonetheless gives the scientists from these countries the chance to switch more easily from the role of a publication consumer to the role of a publication producer. Admittedly, the importance and the standing of these journals has to be qualified, at least if they are determined by their JIF: Open-Access journals and non-English journals are underrepresented in the JIF-Sample (Dong et al., 2005). What is even worse: Packer and Meneghini (2007) found out that journals from the so-called developed world reach significantly higher JIF-scores than the ones from the so-called developing world. These findings correspond with the results of a study by Braun und Dióspatonyi (2005) which proved that researchers from the developing world can hardly be found in the editorial boards of high-impact journals. All these studies indicate a strong underrepresentation and ignorance of scientists and scientific information from developing countries and their exclusion from the scientific discourse. It could be assumed that Open Access will affect only the quantity of scientific information from developing countries, but it seems very doubtful if it will really liberate their scientific communication and give it the acceptance it deserves. Nevertheless, there is a profound and comprehensive interrelatedness between Open Access and other paradigms of openness, such as Open Source, Creative Commons, collaboration and participation; they have especially one thing in common – to conceive and devise viable alternatives to the impending intellectual property regimes (Haider, 2007). After all, free (in the meaning of open) access to information is not sufficient to ensure an informed discussion and genuine publicity. A truly open concept of Open Access and democracy creates not only opportunities to receive and consume information; it also offers opportunities for publication and publicity. About the Author Ulrich Herb is the Repository Manager and Specialist Electronic Publishing at Saarland University and State Library (Germany), he studied Sociology at Saarland University and currently he is doing his PhD in Information Science. He is member of several working groups focussing on Open Access and Electronic Publishing. Additionally he publishes articles on science journalismus as a freelancer for several newspapers. Postbox 15 11 41 D-66041 Saarbruecken Telephone :+49-681-302-2798 Fax: +49-681-302-2796 E-Mail: u.herb@sulb.uni-saarland.de http://www.sulb.uni-saarland.de/de/service/publiktationsangebote/ Notes 1 „ein Universum, das all jene Akteure und Institutionen umfasst, die [z.B.] Kunst, Literatur oder Wissenschaft erzeugen und verbreiten. Dieses Universum ist eine soziale Welt wie jede andere auch, gehorcht aber mehr oder weniger spezifischen sozialen Gesetzen. Der Begriff des Feldes ist nun dazu da, diesen relativ autonomen Raum, diesen mit eigenen Gesetzen ausgestatteten Mikrokosmos zu beschreiben. Er ist zwar, wie der Makrokosmos, sozialen Gesetzen unterworfen, aber es sind nicht dieselben. Obwohl er sich nie ganz den Zwängen des Makrokosmos entziehen kann, verfügt er doch über eine mehr oder minder ausgeprägte Autonomie.“ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 18) 2 „Jedes Feld, auch das wissenschaftliche, ist ein Kräftefeld und ein Feld der Kämpfe um die Bewahrung oder Veränderung dieses Kräftefeldes. Man kann (...) einen wissenschaftlichen (...) Raum wie eine physikalische Welt beschreiben, die Kräftebeziehungen, Herrschaftsbeziehungen enthält.“ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 20) 3 „auf der Anerkennung (oder dem Kredit) (...), den die Gesamtheit der gleichgesinnten Wettbewerber innerhalb des wissenschaftlichen Feldes gewährt.“ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 23) 4 „Ergebnis einer Investition (...) , die sich auszahlen muß. Und diejenigen, die diese Berechtigungsscheine in der Hand halten, verteidigen ihr 'Kapital' und ihre 'Profite', indem sie diejenigen Institutionen verteidigen, die ihnen dieses 'Kapital' garantieren.“ (Bourdieu 1997, p. 23) 5 „die Regeln des Spiels festzulegen, sondern auch die Regelmäßigkeiten des Spiels, die Gesetze etwa, nach denen Spielgewinne verteilt werden, Gesetze, die bestimmen, welche Forschungsgegenstände von Bedeutung sind, die darüber entscheiden, ob etwas als außergewöhnlich oder überholt gilt“ (Bourdieu 1998, pp. 23 f.) 6 “Kampfgegenstand, in der Wahrnehmung ebenso wie in der Wirklichkeit.“ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 25) 7 „unterschwellig ist das 'reine', das uneigennützige Interesse ein Interesse an der Uneigennützigkeit, eine Art des Interesses, die zu allen Ökonomien symbolischer Güter gehört, wo es in gewissem Sinne die Uneigennützigkeit ist, die sich 'auszahlt' (...). So sind die Strategien der Akteure in gewisser Weise immer doppelgesichtig, doppelsinnig, interessengeleitet und interessenlos, beseelt von einer Art Eigennutz der Uneigennützigkeit, der völlig gegensätzliche aber gleichermaßen falsche, weil einseitige Beschreibungen zuläßt, die eine hagiographisch und idealisierend, die andere zynisch und reduktionistisch, wenn sie aus dem 'Wissenschaftskapitalisten' einen Kapitalisten wie jeden anderen macht.“ (Bourdieu 1998, p. 27) 8 „Vom Ideal des freien Marktes, den man gerade so anpreist, ist man weit entfernt, die Wirkungen eines solchen Marktes sind der Wissenschaft nur zu wünschen.“ (Pierre Bourdieu interviewed by Frank Nouchi 1993 in: Bourdieu 1998, p. 80). References * Bo-Christer Björk, 2004. “Open access to scientific publications - an analysis of the barriers to change,“ Information Research, volume 9, number 2, at http://informationr.net/ir/9-2/paper170.html, accessed 12 July 2009. * BOAI Budapest Open Access Initiative, 2002. “Budapest Open Access Initiative,“ at http://www.soros.org/openaccess/g/read.shtml, accessed 12 July 2009. * Pierre Bourdieu, 1997. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag. * Pierre Bourdieu, 1998. Vom Gebrauch der Wissenschaften. Für eine klinische Soziologie des Wissenschaftlichen Feldes. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz. * Pierre Bourdieu, 2002. Homo academicus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. * Tibor Braun and Ildikó Dióspatonyi, 2005. “Counting the gatekeepers of international science journals a worthwhile science indicator,“ Current Science, volume 89, number 9, pp. 1548 – 1551, at http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci/nov102005/1548.pdf, accessed 12 July 2009. * DFG, German Research Foundation, 2005. Publication Strategies in Transformation? Results of a study on publishing habits and information acquisition with regard to open access. Weinheim: Wiley. * Peng Dong, Marie Loh and Adrian Mondry, 2005. “The "impact factor" revisited,“ Biomedical Digital Libraries, volume 2, number 7, at http://www.bio-diglib.com/content/2/1/7, accessed 12 July 2009. * Electronic Publishing Services Ltd., 2006. Scientific, Technical and Medical (STM) Market Monitor. London: Electronic Publishing Services Ltd. * Paul Feyerabend, 1975. Against method: outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge. London: NLB. * Michel Foucault, 1972. The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language. New York: Pantheon Books. * Gerhard Fröhlich, 1995. „Demokratisierung durch Datenbanken und Computernetze?,“ In: E. Fixl and B. Knobloch, B. (editors). Informationsspezialisten zwischen Technik und gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung, Stuttgart, Germany, pp. 55-60. * Gerhard Fröhlich, 1996. „Netz Euphorien: Zur Kritik digitaler und sozialer Netz(werk)metaphern,“ In: A. Schramm (editor). Philosophie in Österreich 1996. Vienna, Austria: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 292-306. * Gerhard Fröhlich, 1998. „Optimale Informationsvorenthaltung als Strategem wissenschaftlicher Kommunikation,“ In: H.H. Zimmermann and V. Schramm (editors). Knowledge Management und Kommunikationssysteme, Workflow Management, Multimedia, Knowledge Transfer. Proceedings 6. Internationales Symposium für Informationswissenschaft (ISI 1998), Konstanz, Germany: Universitätsverlag Konstanz, pp. 535-549. * Jürgen Habermas, 1984. Theory of communicative action. London: Heinemann. * Jutta Haider, 2005. “The Geographic Distribution of Open Access Journals,“ at http://dlist.sir.arizona.edu/939/, accessed 12 July 2009. * Jutta Haider, 2006. “Conceptions of 'Information Poverty' in LIS: An Analysis of Discourses,” In: H. Kjertmann (editor). Proceedings of the 14th BOBCATSSS Symposium: Information, Innovation, Responsibility: The Information Professional in the Network Society, Tallinn, Estonia, pp. 79-89. * Jutta Haider, 2007. “Of the rich and the poor and other curious minds: On Open Access and 'Development',”.ASLIB Proceedings, volume 59, number 4/5, pp. 449-461. * Jutta Haider and David Bawden, 2006. “Pairing information with poverty: Traces of development discourses in LIS,” New Library World, volume 107, number 9/10, pp. 371-385. * Thomas Hess, Rolf T. Wigand, Florian Mann and Benedikt von Walter, 2007. Open Access & Science Publishing. Results of a Study on Researchers’ Acceptance and Use of Open Access Publishing. Munich, Germany: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Institute for Information Systems and New Media. * House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2004. Science and Technology - Tenth Report. London: House of Commons - The Science and Technology Committee, at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmsctech/399/39902.htm, accessed 12 July 2009. * Robert Kiley and Robert, 2006. “Open access to the research literature: a funders perspective,” In: N. Jacobs (editor). Open Access: Key Strategic, Technical and Economic Aspects. Oxford: Chandos, pp. 101-109. * Thomas S .Kuhn, 1970.The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago. * Abel L. Packer and Rogerio Meneghini, 2007. “Learning to communicate science in developing countries,” Interciencia, volume 32, number 9, pp. 643 – 647, at http://www.interciencia.org/v32_09/643.pdf, accessed 12 July 2009. * Jennifer I. Papin–Ramcharan and Richard A. Dawe, 2006. “Open access publishing: A developing country view,“ First Monday, volume 11, number 6, at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1332/1252, accessed 12 July 2009. * Karl Raimund Popper, 1992. The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Routledge. * Alma Swan and Sheridan Brown, 2005. Open access self-archiving: An author study. Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), UK FE and HE funding councils. Truro: Key Perspectives Limited. 1